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Early days: the European Parliament, co-
decision and the European Union 
legislative process post-Maastricht 
 
David Earnshaw and David Judge 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since the European Parliament's first vote on a Council common position submitted 
under the co-decision procedure in January 1994 the practice of co-decision has 
been scrutinized carefully within Parliament and the other European Union (EU) 
institutions. However, such scrutiny has produced differing interpretations. This 
article seeks to assess these respective claims by analysing the first thirty-two 
legislative proposals processed under co-decision, and so to make an initial 
assessment of the legislative impact of the European Parliament under the new 
procedure. 
 
Under co-decision Parliament is a more equal partner in the EU'slegislative process, 
and now has a rightful place alongside Council in several important policy areas - 
despite the weighting of the procedure towards Council. Certainly, informal inter-
institutional linkages have expanded as a result of co-decision and, whatever their 
qualitative effect, there has been an undeniable quantitative increase in the 
interactions between Parliament and Council. 
 
The net result of the dialogue between Parliament and Council is the confirmation of 
an increasingly bipartite bargaining process and this, in turn, has placed the 
Commission in a considerably more ambiguous, and weaker, position than in the co-
operation or consultation procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Compromises rarely satisfy those making them. So it was with Article 189b of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), which introduced the new legislative procedure —
now almost universally referred to as the 'co-decision procedure' - into the EU's 
legislative process.  
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Certainly, the procedure was not what the European Parliament (EP) had hoped for, 
as it was far from the generalized system of co-decision sought by the EP (see 
Lodge 1993:29) and its scope was more limited and its operation more complex than 
initially envisaged by Parliament (see Corbett 1994: 208-10). 
 
That co-decision is an extremely intricate procedure is beyond doubt. Commentators 
and practitioners alike regard the procedure at best as 'highly complex' (Westlake 
1994a: 145) and at worst as 'cumbersome' (European Parliament 1994a: 4). Doubts 
were soon expressed, within months of the negotiation of the TEU, that such 
procedural complexity would 'inevitably lead to much complication, confusion and 
legal wrangling' during the processing of EU legislation. In these circumstances it 
was argued that the enhancement of Parliament's legislative influence would 
'probably depend as much on the imaginative, shrewd and active interpretation and 
use of the new provisions and on [the EP's] negotiating ability... as on the Maastricht 
agreement itself (PE 155.239 1992:6). 
 
Yet, equally, analysts were also convinced that co-decision was 'a remarkable step 
forward' (Westlake 1994a: 146) and 'of fundamental importance to public perceptions 
of Parliament's role: it can no longer be accused of lacking teeth' (Corbett 1994: 
210). Co-decision opened the possibility of systematic, direct negotiation between 
the EP and Council. For the first time Parliament is now an equal partner in the 
legislative process, with acts adopted under the procedure jointly signed by the 
presidents of Council and Parliament. 
 
Since the EP's first vote on a Council common position submitted under the 
procedure in January 1994 (OJ C44,14 February 1994: 81) the practice of co-
decision has been scrutinized carefully within Parliament and the other institutions. 
However, such scrutiny has produced differing interpretations. On the one side, the 
claim has been made that 'in spite of its complicated procedures, [it has] generally 
worked well' (PE 211.919/B 1995: 3); while on the other side the counter-claim has 
been made that it is 'quite a long way from the idyllic state of affairs set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty' (Nicole Fontaine, MEP, European Parliament, Info Memo Press 
Release, 22 February 1995). This article seeks, therefore, to assess these respective 
claims by analysing the first thirty-two legislative procedures processed under co-
decision, and so to make an initial assessment of the legislative impact of the 
European Parliament under the new procedure. 
 
ANATOMY OF THE PROCEDURE 
Co-decision is a development from, and an extension of, the co-operation procedure 
introduced by the Single European Act. Despite its short- comings, the co-operation 
procedure instituted direct dialogue and negotiation between Council and Parliament, 
and first introduced into EU legislative procedures the idea that Parliament could 
constrain the Council's hitherto absolute freedom of action - except when Council 
was unanimous.  
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The co-decision procedure extends this notion to the point where Parliament, in 
certain circumstances, is able to prevent the adoption of EU legislation, even when 
Council unanimously supports it, and institutionalizes a conciliation procedure to 
reconcile the views of Parliament and Council. 
 
The first stage of co-decision remains, as in the co-operation procedure, with the EP 
producing an opinion on the Commission's proposal before Council adopts its 
common position. However, whereas previously the Commission sent its proposal to 
Council - which in turn then asked Parliament for an opinion - the TEU introduced the 
'legal innovation' whereby the Commission now formally sends its proposal directly to 
Parliament at the same time as it sends it to the Council (see European Commission 
1993: 4). Then, at second reading, Parliament may amend Council's common 
position. However, unlike the co-operation procedure, in which Council finally and 
exclusively determines the outcome of these amendments (on the basis of a re-
examined Commission proposal), under co-decision, a conciliation committee must 
be convened if Council does not approve all of Parliament's amendments (whether 
accepted by the Commission or not - though with the Council requiring unanimity for 
amendments not accepted by the Commission). The conciliation committee, 
composed of equal numbers of MEPs and the delegations of Council, is intended to 
bring' together the views of Parliament and Council in a joint text acceptable to both 
institutions. According to both the TEU and the 1993 inter-institutional agreement, 
Arrangements for the Proceedings of the Conciliation Committee under Article 189b 
(OJ C329, 6 December 1993:141-2), the Commission's role in conciliation is merely 
to 'take all the necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the 
European Parliament and the Council'. In this process, the Commission's impact is 
much more limited than in the second reading of the co-operation procedure, as its 
position on Parliament's amendments, once conciliation is embarked upon, no longer 
formally determines the majorities required for the adoption of Council's subsequent 
position. 
 
A conciliation committee may also be convened where the EP declares its intention 
to reject Council's common position. In this case, according to Article 189b(2)(b), the 
objective is for Council 'to explain further its position'. This 'petite' conciliation is not 
intended to produce a joint text. Following the conciliation Parliament may only 
confirm its rejection of the common position, or table amendments to it. Outright 
rejection of Council's common position may also occur where conciliation fails to 
agree a joint text and Council decides to reconfirm its common position. In such a 
case the measure will be definitively adopted unless the EP rejects the text by an 
absolute majority within six weeks (as occurred in the case of open network provision 
(ONP) voice telephony, see below). Where a joint text is agreed in conciliation both 
Council (by qualified majority) and Parliament (by simple majority) are required to 
adopt the measure in accordance with the joint text. Failure to approve the text in 
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this way results in the proposed act being 'deemed not to have been adopted' (Article 
189b(5)), as in the case of the proposal on biotechnological inventions (see below). 
The latter case demonstrated, controversially, that where Parliament's delegation to 
conciliation might be unable to win Parliament's support for a compromise agreed 
with Council in conciliation, it is in Council's interest to be intransigent. Simply stated, 
if agreement is prevented in conciliation, and Council reconfirms its common position 
unchanged, Parliament is then forced either to accept Council's text, or to reject it by 
an absolute majority. Thus, a much more onerous threshold is imposed than the 
simple majority needed for Parliament to reject an agreement reached in conciliation. 
 
THE INITIAL EXPERIENCES OF CO-DECISION 
By the end of the 1989-94 parliamentary term in June 1994,110 proposals for co-
decision legislation had been submitted to Parliament. (This represents about a 
quarter of the EP's legislative workload.) By this date agreement between Council 
and Parliament had been found, and the procedure concluded, on fifteen proposals. 
Four of these cases involved conciliation (European Parliament 1994c: 4; see also 
OJ C205, 25 July 1994: 236). By the end of March 1995, thirty-two co-decision 
procedures had been completed, and, except for those texts rejected, the resultant 
legislation was signed, or awaiting signature, by the Presidents of Council and 
Parliament. 
 
The thirty-two measures subject to the co-decision procedure between January 1994 
and March 1995 are listed in Table 1. Procedures which were still in progress at the 
end of March 1995 are not examined here, but measures upon which substantive 
agreement had been reached but definitive acts not adopted are included. In the 
following discussion attention is concentrated on the processing of legislation after 
Council has adopted its common position, as this is the phase of co-decision which 
provides the greatest contrast with the earlier co-operation procedure. Nevertheless, 
a brief survey of Council's common positions is necessary to indicate Parliament's 
overall impact at first reading in the thirty-two completed procedures. 
 
COUNCIL'S ASSESSMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S IMPACT AT 
FIRST READING 
The general pattern which emerged under the co-operation procedure (see 
Earnshaw and Judge 1995a) - of Council taking up a considerable number of the 
EP's amendments at first reading - can also be identified for the thirty-two measures 
listed in Table 1. This was particularly so where support for Parliament's 
amendments also came from the Commission. In the case of the directive on 
summertime, for example, Council considered that its common position 'incorporates 
most of the amendments adopted 
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Table 1 Co-decision procedures completed by March 1995 
 
Directive or decision Issue 
 
Committee 
responsible 
Date 
agreed 
Directive 94/9 Equipment for use in potentially 
explosive atmospheres 
EMAC 
 
March 1994 
 
Directive 94/10  Technical standards  EMAC March 1994 
 
Directive 9 4 / 1 1  Footwear labelling Environment March 1994 
 
Directive 94/12 Motor vehicle emissions Environment March 1994 
 
 Decision 1110/94  Fourth RTD Framework 
Programme 
CERT 
 
April 1994 
Directive 94/18 Obligation to publish listing 
particulars  
Legal May 1994 
Directive 94/19  Deposit guarantees  Legal May 1994 
Directive 94/20  Mechanical coupling devices  EMAC May 1994 
Directive 94/21 Summertime  Transport May 1994 
 Directive 94/22  Hydrocarbon exploration  CERT May 1994 
Directive 94/25  Recreational craft  EMAC June 1994 
Directive 94/27 12th amendment dangerous 
substances  
Environment 
 
June 1994 
Directive 94/34  Food additives- framework  Environment June 1994 
Directive 94/35  Food additives- sweeteners  Environment June 1994 
Directive 94/36  Food additives- colours  Environment June 1994 
Directive 94/47  Timeshare  Environment Oct 1994 
Directive 94/48 13th amendment, dangerous 
substances  
Environment 
 
Dec 1994 
Directive 94/52  Extraction solvents  Environment Dec 1994 
Directive 94/60 14th amendment, dangerous 
substances 
Environment 
 
Dec 1994 
 
Directive 94/62  Packaging waste  Environment Dec 1994 
Directive 94/63  VOC emissions  Environment Dec 1994 
Decision 3092/94  Home and leisure accidents  Environment Dec 1994 
Regulation 3378/94 Definition of alcoholic drinks 
following the Uruguay round 
External 
Relations 
Dec 1994 
 
 Continuation of Europe against 
AIDS programme 
Environment Jan 1995 
Directive 95/1  Motorcycle speed, torque and 
power  
EMAC Feb 1995 
Directive 95/2 Miscellaneous additives Environment Feb 1995 
Decision 818/95  Youth for Europe programme  Culture March 1995 
Decision 819/95 Socrates programme  Culture March 1995 
 Noise of earthmoving machinery  Environment March 1995 
 Prudential supervision: BCCI 
directive 
Legal Affairs March 1995 
 Open Network Provision in voice 
telephony  
 
EMAC Common 
position 
rejected 
July 1994 
 Biotechnological inventions 
 
Legal Affairs Joint text 
rejected  by 
EP March 
1995 
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by the European Parliament' (Council's Reasons, OJ C137,19 May 1994: 40); on the 
thirteenth amendment to the directive on the marketing and use of dangerous 
substances, Council 'basically went along with the amended Commission proposal' 
which in turn had 'incorporated... all the amendments proposed by the European 
Parliament' (Council's Reasons, OJ C244, 31 August 1994: 11); and, on the Fourth 
Framework Programme, Council's reasons for its common position stated, even 
more strongly, that: 
 
Council has sought to incorporate to the largest extent possible the suggestions 
from the European Parliament, with a view to formulating a text which reflects a 
consensus between the two legislative bodies whilst respecting the overall 
balance of the Commission's proposal. 
(Council's Reasons, OJ C101,9 April 1994:54) 
 
In the reasons on recreational craft, Council noted that the Commission's amended 
proposal had taken up thirteen of the EP's twenty-two amendments and that: 'Almost 
all of those amendments have been adopted by the Council in its common position 
either to the letter or in spirit, and expanded upon in certain cases' (Council's 
Reasons, OJ C137, 19 May 1994: 25). Similarly, on timeshare, Council was 'able to 
include in its common position, whether literally, in substance, or in part, the 
European Parliament's amendments taken on board by the Commission in its 
amended proposal' (Council's Reasons, OJ C137,19 May 1994:47). On the Socrates 
programme Council took up twenty-nine of the Parliament's first reading 
amendments, which numbered over 100, rejecting those which the Commission also 
opposed. Similarly, on the continuation of an EU-wide system of information on home 
and leisure accidents (EHLASS), Council 'accepted without change the amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament which were also accepted by the Commission' 
(Council's Reasons, OJ C244,31 August 1994: 88). Finally, on technical standards, 
Commissioner Bangemann, while addressing Parliament's plenary during the second 
reading debate on Council's common position, noted that of 'the 12 amendments 
tabled, which Parliament adopted in its first reading and which were accepted by the 
Commission, 10 were incorporated into the common position' (DEP 3-442,7 February 
1994:27). 
 
There was one notable exception, however, where Council made no pretence that 
Parliament had significantly influenced its common position. This was the directive on 
emissions from motor vehicles where the Commission 'drew up an amended 
proposal which incorporated three of the 23 amendments proposed by the 
Parliament' (Council's Reasons, OJ C101, 9 April 1994: 12). These three 
amendments were only minor - relating specifically to the recitals of the proposal; 
and so, although subsequently adopted by Council, had no effect on the substantive 
provisions of the common position. 
 
In contrast, there were occasions when Council explicitly supported 
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EP amendments which had not been accepted by the Commission. In its reasons for 
the common position on hydrocarbon exploration, for example, Council noted that it 
had 'accepted, word for word or in substance... five amendments of the European 
Parliament, not inserted by the Commission in its amended proposal' (Council's 
Reasons, OJ C101, 9 April 1994: 20). Parliament's rapporteur, during the second 
reading debate, underlined the significance of this event in his observation that: 
'interinstitutionally speaking it is interesting to note that the Council has not taken any 
notice of the Commission here' (DEP 3-445, 8 March 1994: 39). In addition, five other 
EP amendments were accepted by the Commission and also by Council. This left 
two amendments which were neither incorporated by the Commission in its amended 
proposal, nor accepted by Council. Even with these two, Council was satisfied, none 
the less, 'with the Commission's assurance that it would bear these amendments in 
mind, and did not therefore consider it necessary to amend the texts' (Council's 
Reasons, OJ C101,9 April 1994:20). 
 
PARLIAMENT'S SECOND READING 
In twelve of the thirty-two items of legislation to reach the end of the co-decision 
process by March 1995 Parliament proposed no amendments at second reading. In 
each case legislation was adopted on the basis of the common position agreed by 
Council. On eight of these issues Parliament undertook its second reading 
expeditiously, without further debate. This it did on the basis of a letter of 
recommendation from the relevant parliamentary committee (under Rule 66[7]) or by 
means of the President declaring the common position approved without avote (Rule 
68). Indeed, in one case (the definition of alcoholic drinks following the Uruguay 
round), Parliament completed both its first and second readings within the same 
week so as to enable ratification of the agreement by the end of 1994 (OJ C18, 23 
January 1995:53). However, on four other issues further debate occurred without 
Parliament proposing amendments. These deliberations were motivated, on 
occasion, by a desire to maximize Parliament's policy preferences without the need 
for a formal vote on amendments. 
In the case of the directive on summertime, for example, Parliament's Transport 
Committee succeeded in extracting a commitment from the Commission (which 
apparently had already been given to Council) that it submit a report on the economic 
and other effects of changing over from wintertime to summertime arid vice versa. In 
fact, the need for just such a report had been identified in Parliament's first reading 
amendments, but Council had not incorporated this amendment in its common 
position. With Council anxious to reach a quick decision, it requested Parliament to 
expedite its second reading on this issue. Astutely, the EP raised the possibility of 
delaying its second reading, leading the Commission to declare, forthwith, that it 
'undertakes further to table a report on this to the European Parliament and the 
Council before 1January 1996' (DEP 
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3-447, 22 April 1994: 294). Parliament then went ahead and voted its approval of the 
common position, without amendment. 
 
On the proposal relating to listing particulars to be published for the admission of 
securities to official stock exchange listing, Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee had 
initially decided to propose three amendments to the common position. It became 
clear in April 1994, with European elections looming, that if Parliament amended the 
common position and provoked conciliation, adoption of the directive would be 
delayed. Parliament's rapporteur believed that such a delay would 'not [be] helpful 
either to capital movements or our stock markets' (DEP 3-447, 20 April 1994: 156). 
However, if passed without amendment, the directive would enter into force within 
one month. The rapporteur, along with the Legal Affairs Committee, proposed 
therefore that Parliament 'vote against the Legal Affairs Committee's amendments so 
that this legislation can be brought in immediately' (DEP 3-447, 20 April 1994: 156). 
As a result, Parliament adopted no amendments to the common position, and the 
directive was definitively adopted by Council and Parliament in May 1994. 
 
The continuing problem of absolute majorities 
The difficulty facing Parliament at second reading stage is brought into stark relief in 
the two other cases in which Parliament did not vote amendments to Council's 
common position. The basic problem is that the EP must muster an absolute majority 
to amend a common position. A clear, and early, example of this difficulty was 
provided by the directive on motor vehicle emissions. As noted above, Council had 
already refused, at first reading, to take up any of the EP's substantive amendments. 
Parliament was then faced with a Commission determined to defend Council's 
common position against the second reading amendments proposed by Parliament's 
Environment Committee. The latter sought: first, to tighten 1996 emission standards; 
second, to give member states greater leeway in applying tax incentives; and, third, 
to decide on stricter limits from 1999 immediately, rather than waiting for the results 
of a Commission-industry study on reformulated fuels and new engine technologies. 
Commissioner Bangemann was in no doubt that should Parliament adopt the 
suggested amendments at second reading, 'endless disputes with the Member 
States in the conciliation committee' would ensue, and that 'we know that the 
Member States are not prepared to go further' (DEP 3-444, 7 March 1994: 35). In 
Parliament, however, some members saw the possibility of a sequel to Parliament's 
1989 small cars emissions triumph. Outside there was also considerable press and 
industrial interest in Parliament's second reading which led Parliament's rapporteur, 
Kurt Vittinghof (Soc/Ger), to comment that the 'industrial lobby has never been so 
strong, [and] has never had such an influence as in this case' (DEP 3-444, 7 March 
1994: 30). To the surprise of many, 
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therefore, the plenary vote saw amendments tabled by the Environment Committee 
not only failing to pass the absolute majority threshold but, unusually, actually being 
defeated. The result was that Council's common position was approved unamended. 
The Chairman of Parliament's Environment Committee, reflecting on the debate, 
recorded that it had been 'disfigured by a great deal of misleading and hysterical 
lobbying by a great many people who should have known better, including certain 
Commission officials' (DEP 3-445,9 March 1994:105). 
 
Finally, on the twelfth amendment to the directive on dangerous substances and 
preparations, the EP's Environment Committee proposed an intention to reject the 
common position. Parliament's first reading amendments had been designed to 
restrict the scope of the measure, and this Council had accepted in essence in its 
common position. None the less, Council still sought to follow the Commission's 
proposal that there should be a limitation on the use of nickel in jewellery and similar 
items. The Environment Committee's favoured approach, however, was simply to 
label items containing nickel, thereby enabling the consumer to choose. More 
particularly, Parliament's rapporteur, Caroline Jackson (EPP/UK), argued that the 
Commission had blatantly disregarded the cost to industry of the proposal, and that 
members of the Environment Committee 'find it unacceptable that a Commission 
official could come to our meeting... and say that he had not had any conversations 
with the jewellery industry' (DEP 3-448,3 May 1994:103). Once more, this time in the 
vote to declare an intention to reject, Parliament fell short of the required absolute 
majority threshold. On this occasion there were 214 votes in favour of rejection and 
thirty-seven against (with nine abstentions). While the EPP and Socialist members 
voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Environment Committee's proposal, an 
absolute majority was denied by a combination of absenteeism, owing to impending 
elections, and the dissenting votes of members of the Green and Rainbow groups, 
who considered labelling both as an insufficient safeguard and as offering lower 
levels of protection than already existed in some national legislation. With the loss of 
the vote to declare an intention to reject, Parliament's President therefore declared 
the common position to be approved without amendment. 
 
AMENDED COMMON POSITIONS 
In the first year of the co-decision procedure twenty Council common positions were 
amended by Parliament. Only in fourteen cases, however, did this result in Council 
convening the conciliation committee. In the other six cases, Council went ahead and 
accepted Parliament's second reading amendments. This it did, sometimes against 
the position adopted by the Commission (for example, on technical standards), and, 
on one occasion, on sweeteners in food, against the wishes of a member state which 
had supported the initial common position. On the latter issue, Parliament voted one 
amendment to the common position, to which one 
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member state - France - was vehemently opposed. (France had supported the 
original sweeteners common position.) Protracted negotiations were required, 
therefore, in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) to try to 
reach an accommodation acceptable to the French delegation. Some member 
states, in particular the UK, argued at length that it was important to retain intact both 
the common position itself and also the initial line-up of member states in Council in 
support of the common position. It was thought that adopting the legislation by a 
different qualified majority than had voted the common position could set a 
dangerous precedent. Until this point Council had sought to maintain the same 
majority between the common position stage and the definitive adoption of 
legislation, thereby minimizing the impact of EP amendments at second reading. 
Eventually, a solution was found within COREPER whereby the sweeteners common 
position was definitively adopted with the abstention of the French delegation, and 
with the Commission committing itself (in a Council minute statement) to review the 
offending clause before the directive was implemented nationally. A final part of the 
compromise was that France made a further statement in Council about the 
difficulties it faced on the issue - following which both the sweeteners and colours 
legislation was adopted (for full details, see Earnshaw and Judge 1995a). 
 
INTO CONCILIATION 
By March 1995 twelve measures had been agreed after having been processed 
through the conciliation procedure. All involved conciliation after Parliament's second 
reading, and one issue entailed 'petite' conciliation as well during the second reading 
(after a declaration of intent to reject the common position). Two proposed measures, 
on ONP voice telephony and the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, fell 
after conciliation. 
 
Comitology 
In several cases conciliation was prompted by inter-institutional conflicts between 
Parliament and Council: most notably over the question of comitology. Indeed, the 
issue of comitology was raised 'in one form or another' in most conciliation meetings 
during 1994, and was to prove decisive in the first rejection of Council's common 
position under co-decision (see PE 210.7001995). Comitology is seen both within 
theEP, and beyond, to cause 'a serious gap in the Community's democratic structure' 
(HL 88-11990: para. 154). In the context of co-decision, the inter- institutional dispute 
was first signalled immediately after the entry into force of the TEU, when Parliament 
voiced its disapproval of retaining existing comitology procedures for co-decision 
legislation. Parliament's position was set out in a report from its Institutional Affairs 
Committee, 
 
 
634 
 
drafted by Biagio De Giovanni (Soc/Italy) and considered by plenary in December 
1993. The report argued that existing comitology practices should not apply to 
measures adopted jointly by Council and Parliament under the co-decision procedure 
but should be retained only for those measures adopted by Council alone. Under co-
decision, in Parliament's view, 'full responsibility for legislative acts... lies with Council 
and Parliament' (OJ C20, 24 January 1994: 177). As Biagio De Giovanni 
commented: 
 
The Council used to have a power of delegation to the Commission for the 
execution of acts it had adopted, but it is quite clear that in the case of acts of 
codecision exclusive power of delegation lapses because the Council no longer 
has sole responsibility for the act and it is therefore also clear that this power 
belongs to the Council and the European Parliament jointly. 
(DEP 3-440,14 December 1993:94) 
 
In December 1993 Parliament adopted a resolution based on the De Giovanni report 
on comitology in which it proclaimed that it should have an equal right with Council to 
propose annulment of Commission implementing decisions. It recognized, however, 
that the agreement of both institutions would be necessary for annulment to occur, 
and sought to strengthen the Commission's role by allowing it to adopt measures 
after receiving the opinion of member states and the EP. 
 
These principles were applied for the first time under co-decision in March 1994 on 
the comitology provisions contained in the common positions on mechanical coupling 
devices and recreational craft. In the former, Council opted for a regulatory 
committee, and in the latter for an advisory committee procedure. In both cases, 
Parliament's amendments stipulated that the relevant EP committee, and not simply 
the committee of member state representatives, should be consulted on the 
Commission's draft implementing measures. In the case of the recreational craft 
common position, where Council had already agreed to an advisory committee 
procedure (under which the Commission need only 'take the utmost account' of the 
opinion of the committee), Parliament resisted proposing more restrictive 
implementing provisions than those foreseen by Council. On the mechanical coupling 
devices common position, Parliament went further and also asserted a claim to be 
able to annul implementing measures. 
 
Not surprisingly, Council resisted strongly Parliament's attempt to include these 
principles in the common position on mechanical coupling devices. On this occasion, 
the institutions agreed to differ, with Council maintaining that the correct type of 
committee had been provided, while the EP delegation in the conciliation committee 
dissented from this view and maintained that the principles laid down in the 
December 1993 comitology resolution should apply. The final compromise, agreed at 
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a single meeting of the conciliation committee, was to delete in its entirety the article 
dealing with adaptations to technical progress by comitology. Council was satisfied 
that an implementing committee established under a related framework directive 
would be sufficient in this instance. On this basis, in May 1994, Parliament approved 
the joint text agreed by the conciliation committee, so omitting any reference to 
comitology. 
 
On the proposal on recreational craft, Parliament acceded in conciliation to Council's 
decision to establish an advisory committee, but only after winning a declaration from 
the Commission that Parliament would be kept fully informed of the work of the 
committee. Significantly, on this measure the Commission also 'abandoned the 
exceptions based on confidentiality and urgency' which it had retained in the 1988 
Delors/ Plumb undertaking on comitology (through which Parliament is normally kept 
informed of implementing legislation (European Parliament 1994c; see also Jacobs 
et al. 1992: 234)). Council further agreed to two substantive second reading 
amendments: one specifically excluding from the directive boats designed to carry 
passengers for commercial purposes; and the other a technical amendment 
withdrawing certain provisions concerning fireproofing. 
 
In the case of the ONP voice telephony proposal (see below) the issue of comitology 
led, on the one hand, to Council reconfirming its common position after failure to 
reach agreement in conciliation, and, on the other, to the subsequent rejection of the 
proposal by Parliament. This event finally prompted Council to negotiate more 
expeditiously with Parliament to find a horizontal solution to the comitology problem. 
For its part, Parliament appointed two explorateurs with the intention of concluding 
such an agreement between Parliament, Council and Commission. A series of 
meetings with the German Presidency of the Council and the Commission led 
eventually to a draft modus vivendi on comitology. 
 
Approved at an Inter-Institutional Conference at the end of December 1994, and 
ratified by Parliament in January 1995, the modus vivendi provides for the EP to be 
kept informed of proposals for implementing measures, and also provides the 
opportunity for it to deliver an opinion in cases where implementing committees fail to 
agree and the matter is referred to Council. While stopping far short of granting the 
EP the right to reject comitology decisions (an idea unacceptable to Council), the 
modus vivendi does provide that, in the case of an unfavourable EP opinion, Council 
should take 'due account of the European Parliament's point of view without delay'. 
None the less, this formulation is open to very different interpretations: with 
Parliament considering that it institutes a 'concertation procedure... aimed at reaching 
a compromise' (PE 210.700 1995: 16), while one national government, possibly 
reflecting the views of others, prefers to emphasize instead the fact that the modus 
vivendi 'does not oblige the Council to accept the Parliament's opinion' 
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(HC 70-v 1995: xi). Hence, while the modus vivendi increases the information 
available to Parliament about implementing measures, it is less clear that it 
diminishes the authority of the Council and Commission. Early experience reveals, 
none the less, that the modus vivendi has served to lessen disagreement between 
EP and Council on comitology provisions (at least temporarily - and until the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)). Indeed, since its adoption, Parliament and 
Council have reached rapid agreement on legislation on which substantive 
agreement could be reached promptly (for example, on motorcycle power, and noise 
limits for earth-moving equipment) but which might otherwise have been stalled 
because of conflict over comitology. 
 
'Amounts deemed necessary' 
Another long-standing institutional issue which featured in early conciliations was 
Council's inclination to incorporate binding ceilings on expenditure - known as 
'amounts deemed necessary' - in the text of EU legislation. Parliament and the 
Commission maintain that such amounts are purely indicative and that, moreover, 
Parliament and Council - as the budgetary authority —are responsible for 
determining the funding necessary for EU programmes on an annual basis. In 
addition, the 1982 Joint Declaration on various measures to improve the budgetary 
procedure (OJ C194, 28 July 1982: 1) agreed that 'the fixing of maximum amounts by 
regulation must be avoided'; yet Council effectively continued to sidestep this 
agreement through the practice of setting 'amounts deemed necessary'. 
 
The issue was one of the central points of contention between Parliament and 
Council in the case of the Socrates and Youth for Europe programmes. In both cases 
the process of conciliation was expedited by informal negotiations before 
Parliament's second reading. In these negotiations most of the substantive issues 
between the EP and Council were resolved. Indeed, the reports of Parliament's 
conciliation delegations on both programmes noted that the EP had 'won the day' in 
these informal negotiations (see PE 211.518/fin 1995 and PE 211.519/fin 1995: 6). 
Certainly, in quantitative terms Parliament was successful: with eighteen out of its 
twenty second reading amendments on Socrates, and five out of six on Youth for 
Europe, accepted by Council at the first meeting of the conciliation committee. None 
the less, on the 'amounts deemed necessary' (760 MECU for Socrates and 105 
MECU for Youth for Europe), agreement proved more difficult. Not only was 
Parliament opposed to the entry of specific amounts in the legislation, arguing that 
actual spending should be set during the annual budgetary procedure, but it also 
sought increased funding of 1,005 MECU and 157 MECU respectively {Euro-pean 
Report, 25 January 1995). 
 
Parliament's Committee on Budgets chose in these circumstances to adopt an 
approach paralleling that adopted on comitology - by 
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appointing two explorateurs to negotiate a horizontal solution to the dispute over 
'amounts deemed necessary'. This strategy ultimately proved successful, as the 
Council Presidency and Parliament's explorateurs reached agreement in a joint 
declaration in mid-January 1995, shortly before the second meeting of the Socrates 
and Youth for Europe conciliation committee. However, while the conciliation meeting 
agreed increases in the funding allocated to the programmes (850 MECU for 
Socrates with a review after two years, and 126 MECU for Youth for Europe), 
definitive agreement on the joint declaration on 'amounts deemed necessary' proved 
elusive. In fact, the conciliation meeting was interrupted by numerous adjournments 
for separate meetings of the delegations, and some delegations of Council eventually 
only agreed to its final compromise ad referendum. These reservations were later 
lifted - just within the deadline laid down in the co-decision timetable for conciliation 
—but only after further informal negotiations between Parliament, the Council 
Presidency and the German delegation of Council (the latter 'remained 
unenthusiastic and very isolated' about the joint declaration (PE 211.519/fin 1995:7)). 
In these subsequent negotiations Parliament accepted further minor changes to the 
joint text on 'amounts deemed necessary', and thereby avoided the possibility of 
Council losing its qualified majority in favour of the text agreed by its conciliation 
delegation. Hence, the onus on Council and Parliament to reach agreement on the 
two programmes within the co-decision deadlines led to a resolution of the broader 
institutional question. 
 
In March 1995, the EP plenary ratified the Declaration by the three institutions on the 
incorporation of financial provisions into legislative acts. Its underlying principle is 
that a 'financial framework' for multi- annual programmes may only be included in 
legislation which is adopted by Parliament and Council through co-decision, or 
through conciliation as provided for by the 1975 Joint Declaration on conciliation. 
According to the declaration, such an amount shall provide a 'principal point of 
reference for the budgetary authority during the annual budget procedure', and may 
only be departed from because of 'new objective circumstances ... for which an 
explicit and precise explanation is given' (OJ C68, 20 March 1995: 28-30). However, 
legislative acts not subject to co-decision (or conciliation) are not to contain amounts 
deemed necessary, but where Council includes such a financial estimate this 'shall 
not affect the powers of the budgetary authority as defined in the Treaty' - and this 
shall be referred to 'in every act which includes such afinancial reference'. The 
agreement effectively reduced the gap between Parliament's post-Maastricht 
legislative role and its budgetary role (see Jacobs et al. 1992: 222). Where Council 
and Parliament jointly adopt legislation they may include estimates of financing; 
where Council acts alone it should not. If Council does include a financial estimate, 
the declaration reiterates that the powers of the budgetary authority (Parliament and 
Council) to make amendments remain unaffected. The agreement also 
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encourages Council to embark on conciliation for measures outside the co-decision 
procedure, as 'amounts agreed' in such conciliations would be more difficult for 
Parliament to change at a later stage during the budget procedure. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
The other conciliation procedures centred almost entirely on issues of policy. In the 
case of the proposal on deposit guarantee schemes Parliament passed seven 
second reading amendments. Only four of the EP's seven amendments were 
accepted by the Commission. Nevertheless, with one exception, Council responded 
positively in conciliation to the substance of each of Parliament's amendments voted 
at second reading. As a result, Parliament approved the joint text at its May 1994 
plenary session, and the text was formally signed by the EP and Council Presidents 
later the same month. The exception was provided when the German delegation 
voted against the adoption of the deposit guarantee directive in Council, as its 
provisions were deemed incompatible with Germany's own very high level of 
depositor protection. Germany subsequently brought a case to annul the directive in 
the Court of Justice (Case C-233/94). (This case had the distinction of being the first 
action brought jointly against Council and Parliament as 'co-legislature'.) Germany 
argued that the legal base of the directive, Article 57(2), was insufficient and that 
Article 235, requiring unanimity in Council, should have been used instead. Germany 
also maintained that unanimity in the Council and the co-decision procedure 'are not 
mutually exclusive', and pointed to the requirement for unanimity for the adoption of 
the RTD Framework Programme and cultural measures (OJ C275,1 October 1994: 
20). 
 
However, as one observer notes, the requirement for Council to act unanimously 
under co-decision in the area of research and technological development policy 
'makes an already complicated procedure even more cumbersome' (European 
Parliament 1994b: 14). The Fourth RTD Framework Programme (FP) was one of the 
first issues subject to co-decision, and became the first to result in the convening of a 
conciliation committee under the new procedure. The likelihood that it would be 
processed through co-decision led to informal trialogues being held — bringing 
together the Council Presidency, the Chairman of Parliament's Energy, Research 
and Technology Committee, and the Commissioner responsible for research policy - 
even before the Commission submitted its formal proposal in June 1993. The 
trialogues continued throughout the first reading and through to the conciliation, and 
were judged by the EP to be 'an indispensable instrument for coordination between 
the Community institutions involved in the decision making process' (European 
Parliament 1994b: 21). At an analytical level the trialogues also underscore the point 
that the formal powers of the EP, in this case the very prospect of 
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co-decision, led the Commission and Council to court the EP informally. There was 
both a substantive concern to ensure that the EP's Energy Committee would not 
delay adoption of the fourth FP, and an inter- institutional concern to guarantee the 
smooth operation of the co-decision procedure on one of its first outings (Judge et al. 
1994: 47; see Earnshaw and Judge 1995a for details). 
 
The outcome of this informal collaboration, alongside the formal processes, was 
clear soon after Parliament's first reading, with Council's common position taking up 
no fewer than eighty of the EP's 118 amendments. At second reading the EP's 
Energy Committee decided, therefore, to focus on six key issues and in so 
concentrating its attention Parliament was able to present a unified front. Council, on 
the other hand, was unable to agree a unified approach and so approached the first 
meeting of the conciliation committee 'equipped only with the mandate of the 
common position and the claim that it had already met Parliament's demands to a 
very large extent' (European Parliament 1994b: 43). Divisions in Council were 
exacerbated by the requirement that Council act unanimously on FP decisions. Yet 
on one issue — that of comitology - Council was unanimous in its opposition to 
Parliament's stance. 
 
Conciliation eventually resulted in compromise both between the institutions and 
among Council delegations (for details, see Earnshaw and Judge 1995b). But these 
compromises were only effected by informal negotiations beyond conciliation: 
between, on the one side, the EP, the Commission and Council Presidency; and, on 
the other, among Council delegations in COREPER. 
 
'Petite' conciliation 
Another early co-decision procedure which resulted in conciliation was that relating to 
motorcycle power, speed and torque. This issue is unique 'in being the first and, at 
least until mid-1995, the only one in which conciliation occurred during Parliament's 
second reading, following a declaration of Parliament's 'intention to reject'. The case 
is also unique in terms of Parliament's procedural creativity, through which it sought 
to activate the procedure before entry into force of the TEU (see Earnshaw and 
Judge 1995a). The EP rejected Council's common position, adopted under the co-
operation procedure, some five days before the entry into force of the TEU but, in an 
explanatory qualification to the rejection, stated its intention for the rejection to be 
considered an 'intention to reject' under co-decision, once the TEU came into force 
on 1 November 1993. Subsequently, however, Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee, 
and the EP's Conference of Presidents, decided that all legislative items not 
finalizedby Council before the entry into force of the TEU were to be confirmed by 
Parliament before conclusion by co-decision. This entailed the motorcycle issue 
returning to Parliament's plenary once more in 
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February 1994, for confirmation of the declaration of an intention to reject the 
common position. 
 
According to the TEU, the path chosen by Parliament allowed Council 'to explain 
further its position' in conciliation (Article 189b(2)(c)) - a provision which Council has 
tended to interpret strictly. Parliament, on the other hand, has preferred to interpret 
this 'petite' conciliation as an opportunity to negotiate along similar lines to the other 
conciliation procedure provided for by Article 189b(3). In the case of motorcycle 
power Council members did, however, provide a mandate for the Council Presidency 
to negotiate informally with MEPs. However, both informal contacts and a formal 
meeting of the conciliation committee failed to resolve the divergent positions of 
Council, Commission and Parliament. 
 
'Petite' conciliation having failed, Parliament sought to reject definitively Council's 
common position at its April 1994 plenary session. In the run-up to the June 1994 
European elections, and hence with reduced attendance at plenary, Parliament failed 
to pass the absolute majority hurdle, mustering only 252 votes for rejection, with 
twenty-five against and two abstentions. Co-decision thus had to be relaunched, and 
amendments to the common position agreed. The EP's amendments to the common 
position, subsequently adopted with majorities well above the absolute majority 
threshold, were explicitly based on possible compromises raised during the formal 
and informal conciliations which had occurred earlier. 
 
Still opposed to Parliament's amendments, Council convened the conciliation 
committee, which met for the first time in October 1994 (so setting in motion the six 
weeks - extendable to eight weeks - timetable for its deliberations). At this meeting 
Council accepted that the 'question of a power limit everywhere in the Union would 
be put to one side for now'. It also agreed that the Commission should complete a 
study on the relationship between motorcycle power and road accidents before the 
introduction of EU legislation to limit engine power (AgenceEurope,19 October 1994). 
Hence, Council dropped an earlier agreement, enshrined in its common position, 
which would have allowed member states to permit more powerful motorcycles only 
for five years. Final agreement was reached at the end of December 1994, following 
agreement on the modus vivendi on comitology. On the basis of the modus vivendi, 
the EP and Council joint chairmen of the motorcycle power conciliation committee 
were able to exchange letters approving a joint text which incorporated the 
agreement on substantive issues reached during conciliation. Parliament finally 
approved the joint text in January 1995 with Reuters News Service (18January 1995) 
commenting that: 'There was little doubt... that it was the Parliament in the driving 
seat' on this occasion. 
 
THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE AND CO-DECISION 
By far the greatest burden of processing co-decision proposals in the first year fell on 
Parliament's Environment Committee (see Table 1). Over half 
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of the co-decision procedures concluded by March 1995 came within the 
responsibilities of this single committee. In fact, the Environment Committee was 
responsible for every co-decision procedure concluded during the second half of 
1994, except for one urgent measure which, exceptionally, completed its passage 
through the co-decision procedure in a week. Three of these measures - packaging 
waste, the control of volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions, and the protection 
of purchasers of time- share properties — went to third reading and conciliation. 
 
Timeshare proved to be the least contentious issue. Negotiations focused on just 
four EP second reading amendments, and agreement between Parliament and 
Council was reached during a single meeting of the conciliation committee in 
September 1994. Nevertheless, Parliament's impact through conciliation was 
marked, pushing the Commission significantly beyond what it had been prepared to 
accept at second reading; and beyond what Council had been prepared to accept at 
the outset of conciliation (for details, see Earnshaw and Judge 1995b). 
 
Packaging waste proved to be far more contentious in conciliation. Already at first 
reading the widespread interest of industry and environmental lobbies had found 
reflection in over 100 amendments being tabled to the proposed directive. The 
political sensitivity of the issue was further demonstrated when Council adopted its 
common position only by qualified majority - against the opposition of Germany, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. All three countries supported more stringent legislation. 
 
Matters were further complicated by the fact that, from July 1994, the Presidency of 
the Council was held by Germany, which was firmly opposed to the common position 
subject to negotiation in the conciliation committee. An additional twist to the 
negotiations was provided by the imminent accession to the EU of Sweden, Finland, 
Austria (and, at that time, Norway). All these potential entrants were known to be 
likely to support the minority in Council, and hence, if agreement was not reached 
before the end of 1994, to threaten any future negotiations on the directive. 
 
The packaging directive is also notable for underlining the difficulty in obtaining an 
absolute majority in Parliament at second reading (noted above). Some nineteen 
amendments were adopted at this stage, while forty-two others were lost, despite, in 
many cases, securing large majorities in support. Of the nineteen amendments 
adopted by Parliament nearly half affected recitals, and five related to the definitions 
used in the directive. All were accepted by the Commission: though it had required a 
change of heart by the Commission on five of the amendments - to avoid the need 
for conciliation by seeking the adoption of the amendments by qualified majority in 
Council. 
 
For the Council, however, one of Parliament's amendments proved to be fraught with 
political difficulties to the extent that, at the June 1994 Environment Council, Belgium 
held out against adoption of this single amendment. (This was despite the legal 
services of the Commission and 
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Council composing an interpretative statement which would effectively have nullified 
the amendment's possible impact.) While all Parliament's other amendments could 
readily be accepted by Council, Belgium maintained that this one would result in 
legal uncertainty over the use of national economic and fiscal instruments to promote 
the directive's objectives. Some support for Belgium was eventually forthcoming from 
Luxembourg and the UK (though the UK's position was based on the rather different 
grounds that it feared any adoption of EU-level fiscal measures by qualified majority). 
In the absence of a qualified majority Belgium maintained its opposition and, after 
lengthy negotiations among member state permanent representations, Council 
declared it was unable to accept all the EP's amendments and intended, therefore, to 
convene the conciliation committee. 
 
Parliament, for its part, sought concessions from Council on five amendments which 
had failed to pass the absolute majority hurdle at second reading in return for a 
redrafting of the single amendment disputed by some delegations of Council. This 
strategy seriously divided Council, with the German presidency, on one side, 
showing 'a willingness to take on board the five changes called for by the 
Parliament's delegation' while the Italian delegation, on the other, believed that this 
strategy would set a 'dangerous precedent'. In this the Italians found support from the 
Portuguese, French, Greek and UK delegations. Given these internal divisions, the 
first conciliation meeting appeared, at least to one commentator, to be 'chaotic and 
fruitless' (Environment WatchWestern Europe, 7 October 1994: 3). Agreement 
between Parliament and Council was eventually effected at a third meeting of the 
conciliation committee, after the delegations of both Council and Parliament had 
asked the Commission to 'formulate suggestions for a compromise solution' 
(Environment Watch Western Europe, 18 November 1994: 3). A reworded version of 
the disputed amendment was accepted, as was Parliament's insistence that there be 
a specific reference in the directive to a parliamentary role in the review of the 
practical experience of the legislation. (Significantly, this last point had not figured 
among Parliament's second reading amendments.) The Commission also offered 
Parliament an assurance on comitology, whereby Parliament was to be kept fully 
informed of implementing measures submitted to a regulatory committee established 
by the directive. Parliament made it clear, however, that it accepted this assurance 
'without prejudice either to any position it may adopt on other legislative acts or to the 
position it will adopt in respect of any general agreement between the Institutions on 
this subject' (Statement by the European Parliament entered in the minutes of the 
Conciliation Committee, PE-CONS 3627/94). 
 
Running in tandem with the conciliation on packaging was that on VOC emissions, 
with meetings of the conciliation committee devoted to discussion of both the 
packaging and VOC dossier. As with packaging waste, the German delegation had 
voted against the common position, but 
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again, paradoxically, found itself responsible for co-ordinating Council's stance in 
negotiations with Parliament. At its second reading in March 1994, Parliament 
adopted seven amendments to the VOC common position. A further amendment 
failed, by just six votes, to pass the absolute majority threshold. Of the seven 
amendments, the Commission supported just one. In turn, Council adamantly 
refused to make concessions on anything but this single amendment at the first 
meeting of the conciliation committee; but, at a subsequent meeting, Council did 
eventually concede to Parliament's two main amendments. In return, Parliament 
agreed to drop three of its less significant amendments; while on the contentious 
issue of comitology, the conciliation committee reached an agreement similar to that 
concluded in the case of packaging. Some dissension was expressed within 
Parliament's delegation over these agreements on comitology, but eventually the 
VOC directive - along with that oh packaging -was signed by Council and Parliament 
Presidents at the end of December 1994. 
 
REJECTION 
One Council common position was rejected during the first year of co-decision, and 
one joint text agreed in conciliation failed to gain the approval of Parliament's 
plenary. The rejection occurred on a proposal to apply ONP to voice telephony 
services.The proposal was introduced by the Commission in October 1992, and 
Parliament voted on it at first reading in March 1993. Council's common position, 
submitted to Parliament in July 1993, reflected several of the EP's first reading 
amendments. However, Council added a regulatory committee for the most important 
aspects of the directive's implementation, and opposed a number of Parliament's 
amendments promoting the interests of telephone users and transparency. The 
political sensitivity of the common position was noted by Parliament's rapporteur in 
her recommendation for second reading: 'comitology [has] become a more serious 
issue... as a result of the Council's common position'; and she reiterated the point 
that such a committee procedure 'has been traditionally regarded as unacceptable by 
the Parliament' (PE 206.718/fin, 1993:12). Accordingly, she proposed deletion of the 
regulatory committee, and sought formal consultation of Parliament and Council 
where the Commission requested 'modifications . . . of a significant nature' to adapt 
the directive to new technological developments or to changes in market demand 
(OJ C44,14 February 1994:97). 
 
Thus, the significance of the ONP case is that the issue of comitology became 
entwined with, and provided the opportunity for, Parliament's assertion of its claim to 
some equivalence with Council in the implementation of legislative measures. Of 
equal significance is that this provided the first direct challenge by Parliament to a 
common position under the co-decision procedure. Indeed, the constitutional 
importance of the ONP proposal is underscored in Docksey and Williams' 
observations that: 
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The issue of comitology and the accompanying question of institutional balance 
became so sensitive that for the first time under the codecision procedure the 
conciliation phase failed. This failure made it possible for Parliament to exercise 
its new veto power under the procedure. 
(Docksey and Williams 1994:141) 
 
Both before and during negotiations in the conciliation committee, held during the 
run-up to the June 1994 European elections, Council refused to entertain 
Parliament's position on comitology. Council also disagreed basically with Parliament 
on the substantive issues underpinning the proposal. Without agreement on a joint 
text in conciliation, and amidst the campaign for the election of the new European 
Parliament, Council chose to reaffirm its common position. Parliament, via its 
President, had asked the Commission (pursuant to rule 78[1]) to withdraw its 
proposal, and the Council not to confirm its common position. Council did, however, 
delay its formal confirmation of the common position until the end of June, thereby 
making it possible for the newly elected Parliament to decide on the text at its July 
session - within the six-week timetable laid down in Article 189b. The decision to 
confirm its common position, and to do so by qualified majority, led the Council into 
uncharted constitutional waters (see Earnshaw and Judge 1995b). 
 
At Parliament's first session after the June 1994 elections its rapporteur observed 
that 'the Council has not felt able... to accept any of the amendments nor any of the 
compromise text'. On the unresolved issue of comitology Council limited itself to a 
reiteration of 'its commitment... to return to the discussion of the question of 
comitology. The procedures for implementing this directive will be re-examined to the 
extent that the results of this discussion so require.' As an expression of Parliament's 
dissatisfaction with this outcome the rapporteur called on Parliament to 'stand firm on 
this and by rejecting this report fight for the principle of comitology which has been so 
important' (DEP 4-449,19 July 1994:8). Parliament then proceeded to reject Council's 
reconfirmed common position by an over- whelming 373 votes to forty-five with 
twelve abstentions. 
 
According to Article 189b(5) of the TEU, 'Parliament, acting by an absolute majority 
of the votes cast, and the Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall have a period 
of six weeks . . . in which to adopt' a joint text agreed in conciliation. This stage was 
not reached in the case of ONP voice telephony as negotiations in conciliation failed. 
However, in the case of the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, 
agreement was reached in conciliation, which Parliament subsequently failed to 
ratify. 
 
The proposal on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions was marked by 
serious differences on substantive issues. Indeed, it took Parliament's Legal Affairs 
Committee three attempts for its first reading report to pass through the EP plenary; 
and the proposal eventually spanned three parliamentary mandates before the final 
declaration of 
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rejection in March 1994. First proposed in 1988 under the co-operation procedure, 
the proposal's objective was considered by the Commission at the time to be 
relatively straightforward and primarily technical: it sought to harmonize member 
states' national patent laws in the area of biotechnological inventions, a new area of 
technology in which it was argued that European industry needed a clear and precise 
framework for the protection of its intellectual property. Hence, the Commission 
largely omitted from its original proposal a consideration of the ethical issues raised 
by the patentability of biotechnological inventions and, in particular, the patentability 
of living matter. Only in its amended proposal, following Parliament's first reading, did 
the Commission accept that the ethical dimension could not be ignored and so, 
following Parliament's amendments, moved to incorporate more precise guidelines 
about ethical issues. The Commission also took up, explicitly, Parliament's proposal 
to introduce the concept of 'farmer's privilege' into patent law. 
 
In December 1993 Council adopted a common position on the biotechnological 
inventions proposal (definitively adopted, once finalized, in February 1994) with 
Spain, Luxembourg and Denmark voting against on ethical grounds (European 
Report, 18 December 1993). In May 1994 Parliament adopted only three 
amendments to the recitals of the common position at second reading - basically 
because of the difficulty in securing an absolute majority (see OJ C205, 25 July 
1994:147). However, the significance of one of the three EP amendments made it 
almost certain that Council would convene the conciliation committee. 
 
The conciliation on biotechnological inventions eventually took place after the 1994 
elections. Three meetings of the conciliation committee resulted in an agreement on 
the last day allowed under the co-decision timetable. The compromise saw two of 
Parliament's three amendments included in the text, as well as modifications to other 
recitals and to an article of the common position. In addition, an agreement on 
human genetics was concluded. In total, therefore, as one industry commentator put 
it, 'Council had met many of Parliament's demands, even on amendments that failed 
to secure the required majority' (Scrip,10 March 1995: 5). Of some considerable 
significance also was the series of interpretative declarations adopted, respectively, 
by: Council; Commission and Parliament jointly; the Council and individual 
delegations of Council; Parliament; and the Commission. The conciliation committee 
agreed that some of these declarations should be published in the Official 
Journal. From Parliament's perspective this 'represented a precedent... which the 
[Conciliation] Committee will find useful to have at its disposal in future' (PE 211.522 
1995:18). 
 
Parliament's conciliation delegation proceeded to approve the joint text for 
submission to plenary, by majority vote with four members opposed. One of the 
dissenting members felt moved to submit a formal statement 'rejecting] the majority 
position of the EP delegation to the Conciliation Committee' (see PE 211.523 1995:1) 
on the grounds that, as individual 
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delegations of Council were free to record their dissent from the majority position, so 
could individual MEPs who found themselves in a minority in the EP's conciliation 
delegation. Other members of the conciliation delegation argued within their political 
groups, and later in plenary, for rejection of the text. Outside Parliament, there was 
exceptionally strong lobbying, including noisy demonstrations and picketing of the 
EP, by opponents of the text agreed in conciliation. 
 
In plenary the joint text was rejected by 240 votes to 188 with twenty- three 
abstentions. Splits were evident in most political groups - though Christian 
Democrats tended to vote in favour of the compromise, and Socialists against. The 
French President in Office of the Council, Alain Lamassoure, responded: 'I regret the 
European Parliament's rejection of the compromise... due to an internal problem 
within that institution. This vote reveals a problem of method in the codecision 
procedure.' He concluded that: '[t]he Council delegation spoke for the Council as a 
whole; the Parliamentary delegation has just been disavowed by the plenary session' 
(quoted in Agence Europe, 3 March 1995:5). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Under co-decision Parliament is certainly a more equal partner in the legislative 
process, and now has a rightful place alongside Council in several important policy 
areas - despite the weighting of the procedure towards Council. As Westlake 
observes (1994a: 150): 'The Council, its procedures, its secretariat, its personalities 
and even buildings are no longer "off limits" to Parliament... MEPs are now entitled to 
stalk its corridors and sit at its tables in search of compromise and concession.' In the 
first year this search proved to be highly productive, as Parliament made a real 
qualitative impact on EU legislation. 
 
Indeed, despite initial fears, the conciliation committee had to be convened in less 
than half of the legislative proposals subject to co-decision; in a quarter of the cases 
Parliament was satisfied with Council's common position; and in a third of cases 
voted no amendments to the common position. Even when conciliation did occur, 
Council and Parliament succeeded in reaching a compromise in all but one case, 
and, in another, Parliament's plenary rejected the outcome of conciliation. In terms of 
the EP's amendments to co-decision legislation, the vast majority are now 
incorporated in law. 
 
Moreover, expected delays in the processing of legislation did not materialize. The 
main cause for delay in EU legislative procedures continues to be the time taken by 
Council to adopt its common position (for example, five years in the case of 
biotechnological inventions). 
 
Of those issues which foundered during co-decision, one (ONP voice telephony) did 
so mostly because of constitutional differences (over comitology) which are now 
effectively resolved until the 1996 IGC. On biotechnological inventions, Parliament's 
plenary chose to repudiate the 
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agreed text despite agreement in conciliation. Yet the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions may be considered as a special case, in that it had 
always been a highly emotionally charged issue and one which involved serious 
ethical considerations. In which case, Parliament's rejection of the outcome of 
conciliation is probably not representative of the broader operation of co-decision. 
None the less, Council took this opportunity to criticize Parliament's 'apparent 
inability to get support for agreements made in conciliation committee when they take 
them back to the assembly' (First draft of the Council's Report on the Functioning of 
the TEU, see Reuters News Service, 27 March 1995). 
 
On the positive side, however, informal inter-institutional linkages have expanded as 
a result of co-decision. Hence, during the early conciliation procedures, as Peterson 
(1995: 86) observed, 'informal conciliations and trialogues - involving the Council 
Presidency, EP committee chairpersons and members of the Commission — 
emerged as crucial arenas for informal bargaining.' Informal negotiation also 
increased 'upstream' - with bargaining occurring earlier in the legislative process. 
Thus, in April 1995, for example, one of Parliament's rapporteurs was willing to state 
that the compromise he had negotiated, well before Council adopted its common 
position or Parliament its opinion at first reading, 'is not a starting point for further 
compromises. The package is itself a compromise product of those discussions, 
which have involved all interested parties, including the Commission and the 
Council's expert working group' (Verbatim Report, 5 April 1995: 15). Negotiation and 
compromise at the early stages of decision-making are now also actively encouraged 
by the EP's 1994 Rules of Procedure. The new Rules prompt the Commission to 
table amendments to its own proposals directly in EP committees, rather than having 
to wait until after Parliament's formal first reading (EP Rules of Procedure, 1994,9th 
edn: Rule 56[3]). 
 
At a broader institutional level, one of the early outcomes of co-decision has been the 
conclusion of horizontal agreements between Parliament and Council (and the 
Commission)  
on comitology and on 'amounts deemed necessary'. These are in addition to their 
earlier agreement regularizing interactions at the conciliation stage. The practical 
effect of these agreements should not be underestimated. Westlake (1994b: 101), for 
example, views them as 'an indispensable element, a sort of constitutional glue, used 
to fill in and flesh out the bare framework provided by the inter-governmental 
conferences'. Whatever their qualitative effect, there has been an undeniable 
quantitative increase in the interactions between Parliament and Council. 
 
The net result of the dialogue between Parliament and Council is the confirmation of 
an increasingly bipartite bargaining process and this, in turn, has placed the 
Commission in a considerably more ambiguous, and weaker, position than in the co-
operation or consultation procedures. The ultimate logic of the Commission's position 
is that it needs now to act in a more even-handed manner between Parliament and 
Council in its search 
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for legislative agreement. Unlike the European Parliament, co-decision has not 
strengthened the Commission's role. 
 
What the initial experience of co-decision reveals, therefore, is what we already 
know: that the European Parliament will seek to maximize, through its own internal 
procedures and through informal pressure, its own contribution to the legislative 
process (see Judge et al. 1994: 45-7). Co-decision has been propitious for the EP.If 
Parliament is successful in its quest to extend co-decision 'to all areas in which 
legislation is adopted by the Council (at the very least in all cases where majority 
voting applies)' (PE 211.919/B 1995: 19; PES 1995: 1), its legislative impact will be 
further enhanced and the promise of the procedure's early days will be fulfilled. 
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